

## Ohio Legislative Service Commission

Office of Research and Drafting

Legislative Budget Office

H.B. 128 134<sup>th</sup> General Assembly

# Fiscal Note & Local Impact Statement

Click here for H.B. 128's Bill Analysis

Version: As Introduced

**Primary Sponsor:** Reps. Hoops and Stein

Local Impact Statement Procedure Required: No

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## **Highlights**

- The bill repeals select provisions enacted in H.B. 6 of the 133<sup>rd</sup> General Assembly. Repealing them would decrease costs for ratepayers, including the state and political subdivisions. Specifically, the bill:
  - ☐ Repeals the Nuclear Generation Fund and the Renewable Generation Fund, both of which are custodial funds;
  - □ Repeals the charges originally scheduled to be implemented in January 2021 to raise \$170 million per year from electric distribution utility (EDU) customers;
  - □ Repeals the revenue decoupling mechanism established under section 4928.471 of the Revised Code. Under the mechanism, FirstEnergy is entitled to \$119 million in revenue from its electric ratepayers during calendar years 2020 and 2021. The bill refunds all prior collections to consumers.
- The bill modifies the significantly excessive earnings test (SEET) for Ohio EDUs, by requiring tests for each EDU to be considered separately from its affiliates. The provision may reduce rates paid by some ratepayers, including the state and political subdivisions. Such an outcome depends on numerous other circumstances that are not influenced by the bill, and would potentially affect only ratepayers in the FirstEnergy territory.
- The bill requires the Ohio Power Siting Board (OPSB) to submit a report to the General Assembly, by December 1, 2021, about the electric power transmission system and associated facilities investment.

## **Detailed Analysis**

The bill makes numerous changes to codified laws governing EDUs. Some of these changes codify court decisions, as explained in more detail below. Ohio's six EDUs offer essential electric service to consumers under the terms of an electric security plan (ESP) approved by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO).

#### Financial support for nuclear power plants and solar farms

The bill repeals the legal basis for a new customer charge that was originally scheduled to begin in January 2021. The prospective charge, which is referred to as the "Clean Air Fund rider" in PUCO proceedings, would financially support two Ohio-based nuclear power plants and certain utility-scale, solar energy electric generating facilities. Under H.B. 128, customers would not be charged up to \$170 million per year, from 2021 through 2027. The intended recipients would not receive these proceeds, which would have been dedicated to the nuclear power plants (\$150 million) and qualifying solar farms (\$20 million). Proceeds of this rider were to be deposited into two custodial funds established by H.B. 6, the Nuclear Generation Fund and the Renewable Generation Fund. The two funds are eliminated by the bill. Payments from the two funds were to be administered by the Ohio Air Quality Development Authority (OAQDA).

The Clean Air Fund rider did not begin as scheduled because of ongoing judicial proceedings. On December 21, 2020, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas issued a preliminary injunction in *State of Ohio v. FirstEnergy Corp.*, et al., Case No. 20CV-06281, et al. Among other provisions in the preliminary injunction, the court ordered PUCO to revoke "authorization for electric distribution utilities to collect the H.B. 6 Rider."<sup>1</sup>

#### Revenue decoupling mechanism

The bill repeals the legal basis for the revenue decoupling mechanism for EDUs enacted under H.B. 6. This mechanism is referred to as the "Conservation Support Rider" in filings with the PUCO, and PUCO approved an application by the relevant EDUs to reduce the rider to zero on February 2, 2021. The bill would therefore codify this PUCO action.

In general, a decoupling mechanism separates a utility's revenues from the volume of electricity it delivers. Consequently, a decoupling mechanism ensures that an EDU's revenue target<sup>2</sup> is reached, regardless of how much electricity is sold. Energy efficiency and peak demand reduction requirements began in 2009, upon the enactment of S.B. 221 of the 127<sup>th</sup> General Assembly. Decoupling riders were subsequently implemented for EDUs' residential and commercial customer bases.

The FirstEnergy companies were the only EDUs to implement a decoupling mechanism using the legal authority enacted in H.B. 6. The bill set base distribution revenues collected in

P a g e | 2 H.B. 128, Fiscal Note


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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The OAQDA subsequently informed PUCO that any payments to be made to Energy Harbor Corp. (Energy Harbor) and its affiliates and subsidiaries pursuant to Chapter 3706 will temporarily cease and that no further nuclear generation credits will be issued to Energy Harbor while the preliminary injunction remains in effect.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The type of revenue target can vary, whether based on revenue per customer or an aggregate amount.

calendar year (CY) 2018 as the baseline against which future years' receipts are measured. The three FirstEnergy EDUs imposed the Conservation Support Rider in February 2020, which collected the difference between CY 2019 receipts and the CY 2018 baseline amount.

Because the Conservation Support Rider does not normalize kilowatt-hour (kWh) sales for weather fluctuations or adjust for changing customer counts, the rider is highly correlated with the amount of kWh sold to residential and commercial customers. FirstEnergy's kWh sales are not expected to return to CY 2018 levels over the next decade.<sup>3</sup> Under this scenario, the Conservation Support Rider would likely yield a customer charge (rather than a credit on customers' electric bills) over its entire lifespan.



FirstEnergy's Forecasted kWh Sales to Residential and Commercial Customers, 2020 to 2030

Table 1 summarizes the annual rider collections forecasted by FirstEnergy EDUs in their recent regulatory filings, as approved by PUCO. Codified law requires PUCO to approve any application that meets the eligibility criteria originally enacted by H.B. 6. FirstEnergy entered a settlement agreement with the Ohio Attorney General and stopped collecting these receipts on February 2, 2021. By repealing the codified law authorizing this decoupling rider, the bill eliminates any future revenue entitlement for the EDUs.

P a g e | **3** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> FirstEnergy's most recent long-term forecast submitted to PUCO is source for kWh sales data in the chart. Refer to FORM FE-D1 in PUCO Case No. 20-0657-EL-FOR, *In the Matter of the Long-Term Forecast Report* (April 15, 2020).

Table 1. Estimated Collections and Monthly Impact of H.B. 6 Decoupling Mechanisms*								
EDU	Total Approved Rider Collections in 2020, All Customer Classes	Monthly Residential Rider in 2020	Total Approved Rider Collections in 2021, All Customer Classes	Monthly Residential Rider in 2021				
Cleveland Electric Illuminating	\$9,327,089	\$1.01	\$44,631,811	\$2.88				
Ohio Edison	\$4,704,326	44¢	\$40,138,797	\$4.01				
Toledo Edison	\$3,088,997	79¢	\$17,107,478	\$3.92				
Total	\$17,120,412		\$101,878,086					

Source: PUCO Case No. 19-2080-EL-ATA (FirstEnergy's EDUs)

The bill further requires all H.B. 6 decoupling amounts to be refunded, so the entire sum in Table 1 identified for calendar year (CY) 2020 would be returned to customers, and an appropriate share of the CY 2021 annual amount would also be refunded under the bill. This bill's provisions to repeal and refund the Conservation Support Rider would codify a reduction in costs for ratepayers in the FirstEnergy territory, including the state and political subdivisions.

## Significantly excessive earnings test

The bill repeals a provision enacted in H.B. 166 of the 133<sup>rd</sup> General Assembly that affected EDUs and how PUCO administers the SEET. The bill restores the previous law that required affiliated EDUs to separately calculate their return on equity for their annual SEET proceeding. Beginning with the 2019 SEET, the three FirstEnergy-affiliated EDUs combined their reporting so a single return on equity, representative of the three EDUs, was submitted to PUCO. The other EDUs in Ohio are not affiliated, so the bill affects only the three FirstEnergy EDUs that operate under a joint ESP – Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Toledo Edison Company.

## **SEET methodology**

Pursuant to section 4928.143(F) of the Revised Code, PUCO is required to evaluate the earnings of each electric utility's approved market rate offer (MRO) or ESP to determine whether the plan or offer produces significantly excessive earnings for the electric utility. In making such a determination, the statute directs PUCO to evaluate the return on common equity of the EDU each year to determine if it is "significantly in excess of" the return on common equity during the same period earned by publicly traded companies (including utilities) that "face comparable business and financial risk, with such adjustments for capital structure as may be appropriate." If PUCO determines that result did occur, the statute provides customer refunds. The SEET was originally enacted by S.B. 221 of the 127<sup>th</sup> General Assembly. The statute did not provide more

P a g e | 4 H.B. 128, Fiscal Note

<sup>\*</sup>On February 2, 2021, PUCO approved, in the Case Nos. 21-0101-EL-ATA, the application of Ohio Edison Company, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and the Toledo Edison Company to set the charges for the Conservation Support Rider to zero.

detailed direction than the above, so several details of the implementation were delegated to PUCO. The Commission later established policy and SEET filing directives for the electric utilities.<sup>4</sup>

Staff endorses the concept that a return on common equity in excess of 1.28 times the standard deviation above the mean of a comparable group of companies should be defined as earnings significantly in excess, except in a low earnings environment when 200 basis points could be substituted.

Having fully considered all the comments regarding establishing the threshold and in consideration of the discretion afforded the Commission in S.B. 221, the Commission, concludes that "significantly excessive earnings" should be determined based on the reasonable judgment of the Commission on a case-by-case basis.

.... Passing a statistical test does not, in and of itself, demonstrate that excessive earnings did not occur.... The Commission may use a standard deviation test as one tool by which to determine whether an electric utility had significantly excessive earnings.

However, the Commission is willing to recognize a "safe harbor" of 200 basis points above the mean of the comparable group. To that end, any electric utility earning less than 200 basis points above the mean of the comparable group will be found not to have significantly excessive earnings.

## FirstEnergy's SEET proceedings

Table 2 below reprints values determined in FirstEnergy's annual SEET proceedings before PUCO from 2009 through 2019. Each FirstEnergy-affiliated EDU met PUCO's "safe harbor" standard in every year, except for a 2018 occurrence when Ohio Edison's return on equity exceeded that value. For that instance, Ohio Edison's earnings might be considered excessive, but not significantly excessive. As seen in the table, none of the EDUs' values exceeded the standard deviation test, which is what FirstEnergy regarded as the threshold for determining significantly excessive earnings.

The "standard deviation test" column in the table is not labeled as the "SEET threshold" because PUCO may adopt an alternative delineation point, if an EDU's financial situation warranted such attention. For example, FirstEnergy applies a different multiple to the standard deviation, 1.64, than the number originally recommended by PUCO staff, 1.28. These small differences demonstrate that the Commission accepts other methodologies as an appropriate alternative for determining the SEET threshold. Other minor variations in methodology have been incorporated since PUCO originally released its SEET directives in 2010.

Page | 5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> PUCO Case No. 09-0786-EL-UNC, Finding and Order (June 30, 2010).

Table 2. Annual Return on Equity Determined in FirstEnergy's SEET Cases						
Before PUCO, 2009 to 2019						

Year	Safe Harbor Test	Standard Deviation Test	Cleveland Electric	Ohio Edison	Toledo Edison
2009	11.90%	15.80%	5.2%	6.2%	3.8%
2010	13.12%	17.74%	1.4%	11.7%	5.8%
2011	13.37%	19.97%	1.7%	10.0%	1.2%
2012	12.5%	17.67%	3.1%	12.2%	4.2%
2013	12.6%	18.10%	4.4%	11.3%	5.4%
2014	11.9%	15.8%	4.6%	11.5%	8.4%
2015	12.2%	14.5%	5.2%	10.8%	6.1%
2016	12.2%	14.8%	3.4%	10.2%	4.4%
2017*	14.3%	19.2%	4.0%	12.22%	6.4%
2018*	13.3%	19.3%	5.8%	13.9%	6.9%
2019*	12.9%	17.8%	10.9%, combined reporting after H.B. 166		

<sup>\*</sup>Results for 2017, 2018, and 2019 are not yet final because PUCO has yet to issue an "Opinion and Order" in these proceedings.

Note: The Safe Harbor Test and Standard Deviation Test for 2009-2013 reflect those measures for Ohio Edison. Beginning in 2014, FirstEnergy submitted a single threshold for each metric rather than three different numbers tailored to each EDU.

## Fiscal impact of recent Ohio Supreme Court decision

When performing the annual SEET for its EDUs, FirstEnergy adjusted their net income and common equity to "eliminate the revenue, expenses, or earnings of any affiliate company, to reflect items contemplated by the Companies' fourth Electric Security Plan ("ESP IV"), and for other non-recurring, special or extraordinary items." In doing so, FirstEnergy excluded the revenue impact of its Distribution Modernization Rider (DMR) in each of the three years the rider was levied, 2017-2019. The DMR was removed from FirstEnergy's ESP IV after the Ohio Supreme Court declared it unlawful in its June 19, 2019 decision.<sup>5</sup>

On December 1, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that PUCO should not have excluded FirstEnergy's DMR in its SEET calculations for 2018 and 2019 and required FirstEnergy to refund to ratepayers money already recovered under the rider. Thus, the Court reversed PUCO's previous order that DMR revenues could be excluded from FirstEnergy's SEET calculations.

P a g e | **6** H.B. 128, Fiscal Note

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> *In re Application of Ohio Edison Co.*, 157 Ohio St.3d 73, 2019-Ohio-2401.

PUCO's original approval of the DMR enabled the three FirstEnergy utilities to collect a combined annual amount of \$132.5 million. The revenue target was approved on an after-tax basis, so actual collections authorized by PUCO ranged from \$168 million (under 21% federal corporate tax rate effective for 2018 and 2019) to \$204 million (under previous 35% federal tax rate effective for 2017).

The amounts in Table 2 exclude the DMR revenues for 2017-2019, as those regulatory cases are awaiting PUCO's final opinion and order. With the addition of DMR revenues, Ohio Edison's 2018 return on equity could exceed the standard deviation test identified in Table 2. Fewer details are known about individual EDUs' circumstances during CY 2019 and CY 2020, but the bill requires PUCO to reconsider any SEET determination or order made between October 17, 2019 (effective date of H.B. 166), and the effective date of H.B. 128. FirstEnergy would likely be required to submit more information about their EDUs' respective returns on equity for those two years.

#### **Ohio Power Siting Board**

The bill requires OPSB to submit a report to the General Assembly, not later than December 1, 2021, on "whether the current requirements for the planning of the power transmission system and associated facilities investment in this state are cost effective and in the interest of consumers." The report may include any recommendations for legislative changes to ensure transmission planning is cost effective and in the interest of consumers. The bill enumerates nine topics that OPSB may address when making its recommendations. The report must be completed in consultation with JobsOhio, but OPSB may consult with or request the assistance of PJM, the independent market monitor, and other interested stakeholders. Before completing the report, OPSB must hold at least one public meeting.

The Board does not have a funding source or appropriation for general purpose operating activities. All of its spending is billable to various utilities that submit applications for OPSB's consideration of specific projects. This fee-based system does not appear to offer a funding source for preparing the required report, unless another existing appropriation in the PUCO budget could be used.

## Other provisions

The bill repeals other provisions enacted by H.B. 6 related to payments from the Nuclear Generation Fund and Renewable Generation Fund. By repealing authorization for payments from the two funds, these provisions would lose any effect, so the bill repeals them as well. For example, the bill repeals a provision that required PUCO to conduct annual retrospective management and financial reviews of the owner or operator of a nuclear generation resource receiving payments from the Nuclear Generation Fund. Repealing this provision would reduce administrative costs for PUCO, which were to be paid from the Nuclear Generation Fund.

H.B. 128 also repeals certain public utility tangible personal property (PUTPP) tax valuation procedures related to the payments. H.B. 6 prohibited an owner from valuing PUTPP at less than its taxable value as of October 22, 2019, if the owner received such payments. Similarly, if the owner of such a facility petitioned for a reassessment of its taxable value below its value as of October 22, 2019, the Tax Commissioner was prohibited from granting such a reduction.

Page | 7

The amount of taxes (and their related PUTPP values) paid by these nuclear power station owners is privileged information, but an analysis of PUTPP values reported for relevant taxing jurisdictions suggests the nuclear plants' PUTPP has already declined by 65% to 85% from tax year (TY) 2016 to TY 2018. Although further devaluation is possible, it is unlikely to decline to a value of \$0, even if the nuclear power plants cease operations.

HB0128IN/th

Page | 8 H.B. 128, Fiscal Note